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PUSHING DOCTRINAL LIMITS:
THE TREND TOWARD APPLYING YOUNGER ABSTENTION
TO CLAIMS FOR MONETARY DAMAGES AND RAISING
YOUNGER ABSTENTION SUA SPONTE ON APPEAL
E. MARTIN ESTRADA*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Younger v. Harris,' the United States Supreme Court held that
where a plaintiff files a federal action requesting that a federal court enjoin
ongoing state criminal proceedings, the proper procedural course of action
is for the federal court to abstain from adjudicating the suit by dismissing
the federal action. 2 The Court has since permitted modest expansion of this
ostensibly narrow abstention doctrine: It has precluded federal interference
in state civil proceedings that resemble criminal actions.3 It has also held
that Younger applies to federal claims for declaratory relief as well as
injunctive relief.4
Within the lower courts, the Younger doctrine's expansion has been far
more sweeping. A plurality of circuit courts of appeals have held that
Younger abstention applies not only to federal claims seeking equitable
relief, but also to actions requesting monetary damages only.5 Further,
many courts have opined that Younger abstention can be raised on the
court's own motion at the appeals stage, notwithstanding the status of the
parallel state court proceedings. 6
*Litigation Associate, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP; J.D., Stanford Law School. Special
thanks to Kerry C. O'Neill and North Dakota native Derik T. Fettig for their insightful feedback
on earlier drafts of this Article. I am also indebted to Judge Robert J. Timlin for inspiring me to
write this Article. This Article is dedicated to my grandparents, Hermodio Benedicto Barrera,
Carmen de Barrera, and Blanquita Perla Estrada.
1. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2. Younger, 401 U.S. at 54.
3. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1971) (concerning prosecution under
New York anarchy statutes); see also infra Part II (discussing jurisprudence on the subject of
federal interference in state court civil proceedings resembling criminal actions in greater detail).
4. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem, 422 U.S. 922, 927-28 (1974) (applying the Younger and
Samuels decisions to requests for injunctive relief from town ordinance prohibiting topless
dancing brought by three bar owners); see also infra Part 1.
5. See infra Part III (discussing lower court expansion of Younger to actions for money
damages); see also Deakins v. Monagham, 481 U.S. 193, 208 (1988) (White, J., concurring)
(internal citations omitted) (mentioning that a plurality of lower courts apply Younger to money
damages).
6. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477 (1977).
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These latest extensions thrust the Younger doctrine into dubious terri-
tory. Unlike claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, claims for money
damages lie well-beyond the Younger doctrine's roots: interests of equity
and comity. 7 Further, because money damages are often unavailable
through the underlying state court proceedings, full application of the
Younger doctrine to federal claims for money damages would, in many
instances, entirely deny a litigant of any monetary relief. Thus, where a
court chooses to apply Younger abstention to monetary damages, a diluted
form of the doctrine should be employed such that the federal damages
claims are stayed rather than dismissed.
Sua sponte application of Younger abstention on appeal is similarly
suspect. As will be discussed, the basis for such sua sponte abstention on
appeal rests on shaky ground-obiter dictum in a footnote that is not at all
concerned with Younger abstention. 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court has not
directly addressed the issue of whether Younger abstention can be raised
sua sponte on appeal. 9 If the Court were to address the issue, all indications
suggest it would disfavor such application.10 After all, Younger abstention
is distinct from subject-matter jurisdiction, which a court is constitutionally
obligated to examine at all stages of a case.lI Unlike subject-matter juris-
diction, Younger abstention is a common law creation that does not go to a
federal court's power to entertain a dispute and, in fact, is discretionary.12
Hence, subject-matter jurisdiction and abstention should not be treated
alike. The incongruity of applying Younger abstention on appeal is espe-
cially evident where there exists the possibility that a court will dismiss an
otherwise viable federal lawsuit long after any parallel state court pro-
ceedings have concluded.13 Such application seems incompatible with the
Supreme Court's rationale in promulgating the Younger doctrine: deference
7. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
8. See Belloti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (providing the United Supreme Court
dicta on which sua sponte application of the abstention doctrine is based). See also infra notes
126-144 and accompanying text (expanding upon the origins of sua sponte application of Younger
in the Belloti case footnote).
9. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
10. Indeed, in a related context, the Supreme Court has recently circumscribed the extent to
which the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which precludes federal district court review of state court
judgments, can "overrid[e] Congress's conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with
jurisdiction exercised by state courts." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct.
1517, 1521 (2005). The Exxon Court held that the lower courts had extended the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine "far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases." Id.
11. See Steel Co. v. Citizens For Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (noting that
jurisdiction is a threshold issue that must be raised sua sponte).
12. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977).
13. See infra Part IV.
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to state court processes, or "Our Federalism."14 Therefore, if anything, sua
sponte application of Younger abstention on appeal should be disfavored.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S YOUNGER ABSTENTION
JURISPRUDENCE
Younger abstention was borne out of the criminal context. In Younger,
the Supreme Court reviewed a federal district court order enjoining the
continuation of a state criminal action based on constitutional infirmities in
the State's criminal procedure.15 The United States Supreme Court dis-
approved of the district court's order-it held that the district court should
have instead abstained from deciding the case in deference to the state
criminal proceedings.16 The Younger Court's reasoning was not based on
any direct constitutional directive, but rather on comity and equity concerns
arising out of the common law.' 7 The Court held that the lower court's
injunction violated "the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or
enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circum-
stances." 18 Especially significant to the Court's holding was its desire to
preserve the comity interests so integral to federalism's successful opera-
tion-respect for the ability of state courts to safeguard federal consti-
tutional rights.19 To prevent state courts from adjudicating questions of
federal constitutional import would be to disregard their central and coequal
role in the federal framework. Thus, in requiring that federal courts abstain
from adjudicating federal actions seeking to halt state criminal proceedings,
the Supreme Court intended to preserve:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that
the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are
14. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (referring to the concept of "our
federalism").
15. Younger, 401 U.S. at 40.
16. Id. at41.
17. See id. at 44 (stating that the "fundamental purpose" of policies against federal courts
interfering in state courts or "equity jurisdiction" is because of comity). Comity can be defined as
"the practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions),
involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts .... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 284 (8th ed. 2004).
18. Id. at 41.
19. ld. at 44.
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left free to perform their separate functions in their separate
ways.20
Also driving the Supreme Court's holding in Younger was the
historical disinclination of courts of equity to interfere in criminal pro-
ceedings. 21 Because it was being called upon to issue injunctive relief, the
Court explained that the district court in Younger was functioning as a court
of equity, not a court of law. 22 The Court noted that it is a "basic doctrine
of equity jurisdiction that courts of equity should not act, and particularly
should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has
an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury .... "23
Although this doctrine of equity originated from British common law, the
Court instructed that the doctrine's "fundamental purpose of restraining
equity jurisdiction within narrow limits is equally important under our
Constitution." 24 The Court pointed to the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793 as an
example of Congress's historical efforts to ensure that equitable relief be
restrained so as not to conflict with legal proceedings. 25
In light of the Younger Court's comity and equity concerns, at its core,
the Younger decision stood for the proposition that because state courts are
competent to resolve issues pertaining to federal constitutional law, federal
courts should not wield their equitable powers to intervene in state criminal
proceedings, even where those proceedings touch on federal constitutional
issues.26 Instead, the proper course of action in the federalist system is for
the defendant to present any and all constitutional questions arising from
the criminal action to the coequal state court.27 As a practical matter,
Younger foreclosed the option of having an Article III court adjudicate
constitutional issues implicated in ongoing state criminal proceedings
except on certiorari to the Supreme Court28 and obliged state defendants to
20. Id. See also Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977) ("[Iln a Union where both
the States and the Federal Government are sovereign entities, there are basic concerns of
federalism which counsel against interference by federal courts, through injunctions or otherwise,
with legitimate state functions, particularly with the operation of state courts.").
21. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45.
22. Id. at 53-54.
23. Id. at 43-44.
24. Id. at 44.
25. Id. at 43 (quoting I Stat. 335 (1793)).
26. In a later case, the Court stressed, however, that the comity and federalism principles at
work in Younger did not require abstention where "no state criminal proceeding is pending at the
time the federal complaint is filed." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974).
27. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43.
28. Assuming such interlocutory appellate review is permissible under the particular state
procedure in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) (providing for discretionary review by the
United States Supreme Court).
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litigate those constitutional issues before the state court, regardless of the
outcome.
However, what began as a rather narrow principle of federal juris-
diction rooted in respect for the integrity of state criminal prosecutions soon
expanded to encompass state civil actions. In Huffinan v. Pursue, Ltd.,29 a
local sheriff and prosecutor initiated a civil nuisance action against an adult
theater in state court.30 The adult theater sought to enjoin the state action in
federal court. 31 Noting that the state proceeding was "in aid of and closely
related to criminal statutes," the Huffman Court held that the Younger
doctrine's principles applied with equal force to bar federal interference
with the civil nuisance action.32 Although the state civil nuisance action
was not criminal in nature and hence did not align perfectly with Younger,
"the considerations of comity and federalism which underlie Younger"
applied with equal force to the criminal-like state proceedings. 33
In a dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that Younger was the
culmination of a long line of cases holding that federal equity powers
should not be used to interrupt state criminal proceedings. 34 While they
foreclosed federal interference in state criminal proceedings, Justice
Brennan explained that these same precedents permitted the exercise of
equitable jurisdiction to stay state civil proceedings. 35 By ignoring these
precedents, the Court was "overrul[ing] some 18 decades of this Court's
jurisprudence." 36 Justice Brennan warned that applying the Younger doc-
trine to civil actions would give the States broad power to selectively
extinguish federal claims by employing the less stringent burden of proof
standards applicable to civil actions. 37 Justice Brennan also predicted the
current movement to broaden the applicability of the Younger doctrine,
writing that the Court's decision was "obviously only the first step toward
extending to state civil proceedings generally the holding of Younger v.
Harris that federal courts should not interfere with pending state criminal
proceedings except under extraordinary circumstances." 38
29. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
30. Huffinan, 420 U.S. at 595.
31. Id. at 598-99.
32. Id. at 604.
33. Id. at 610.
34. Id. at 613-15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 614.
36. Id. at 615.
37. Id. at 615-16.
38. Id. at 613 (emphasis in original and citation omitted).
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The comity rationale so important in Huffinan was again relied upon in
Juidice v. Vail,39 where the Supreme Court applied the Younger doctrine to
civil contempt proceedings. 40  In Juidice, the Court rejected a narrow
reading of the Younger doctrine, and held that "the principles of Younger
and Huffman are not confined solely to the types of state actions which
sought to be enjoined in those cases."41 While acknowledging that civil
contempt proceedings were not as significant a state interest as the
enforcement of criminal or quasi-criminal laws which were at issue in
Younger and Huffinan, the Court held that the State's contempt process "is
of sufficiently great import to require application of the principles of those
cases."
42
Similarly, in Trainor v. Hernandez,43 the Supreme Court held that
Younger prohibited federal litigation seeking to enjoin a state civil fraud
proceeding for recovery of excess welfare benefits.44 In light of "the
negative reflection on the State's ability to adjudicate federal claims that
occurs whenever a federal court enjoins a pending state proceeding," 45 and
since the underlying state proceeding was "brought to vindicate important
state policies," 46 the Trainor Court stated that Younger's rationale applied
with equal force to the state civil fraud proceedings at issue.47 Later, in
Moore v. Sims, 48 the Court summarized the end-result of its decisions in
Huffinan, Juidice, and Trainor: The Younger doctrine, the Court explained,
is "fully applicable to civil proceedings in which important state interests
are involved." 49
The Supreme Court more fully explained the Younger doctrine's
operation in the civil context in Middlesex Ethics Committee v. Garden
State Bar Association.50 In Middlesex, the Court held that the comity
principles underlying the Younger doctrine precluded a federal action
attempting to halt state civil attorney disciplinary proceedings.5' Although
39. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
40. Juidice, 430 U.S. at 328-29.
41. Id. at 334.
42. Id. at 335.
43. 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
44. Trainor, 431 U.S. at 444.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 446.
47. Id. at 444, 446.
48. 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
49. Moore, 442 U.S. at 423.
50. 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
51. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435, 437. Justice Brennan concurred with the Court's holding for
the reasons stated in Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, but continued "to adhere to" his
480 [VOL. 81:475
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the underlying state proceedings were not criminal in nature, the Court
instructed that "[t]he policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to
noncriminal judicial proceedings" so long as "important state interests are
involved."52 In the civil realm, the Court instructed that the presence of
important state interests is evinced by parallel state proceedings that "bear a
close relationship to proceedings criminal in nature," or that are "necessary
for the vindication of important state policies or for the functioning of the
state judicial system." 53 Distilling its Younger abstention jurisprudence, the
Court instructed that Younger abstention is appropriate where: (1) there are
ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) those state proceedings implicate
important state interests; (3) the state proceedings provide the federal
plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims; and (4)
the federal litigation will interfere with the state proceedings. 54
In addition to extending Younger abstention to cover state civil
proceedings, the Supreme Court has held that Younger abstention applies
with equal force to federal litigation seeking declaratory rather than
injunctive relief. In a companion case to Younger, the Court in Samuels v.
Mackell,55 determined that a federal court could not entertain a lawsuit by
plaintiffs seeking a declaratory ruling that the criminal anarchy law sup-
porting their state criminal prosecutions was unconstitutional. 56 Pointing
out that declaratory relief, like injunctive relief, has its basis in common law
equity jurisdiction and that declaratory relief can "result in precisely the
same interference with and disruption of state proceedings," the Court
opined that Younger's rationale extended to federal actions seeking
declaratory relief.5 7 "[T]he basic policy against federal interference with
pending state criminal prosecutions," the Court stated, "will be frustrated as
much by a declaratory judgment as it would be by an injunction."58
Accordingly, the Supreme Court established that federal equity jurisdiction
conclusion "that Younger v. Harris is in general inapplicable to civil proceedings." Id. at 438
(Brennan, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 432.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also Moore v. Simms, 442 U.S. 415, 426 (1979) (stating that a federal court
should not abstain if "state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims"); Green
v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 2001) (listing necessary elements for invoking
Younger abstention); Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. Of Med. Exam'rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir.
1999) (same); Trust & Inv. Advisors, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).
55. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
56. Samuels, 401 U.S. at 68-69.
57. Id. at 70, 72.
58. Id. at 73.
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could not be invoked to disrupt state criminal proceedings, either through
injunctive or declaratory relief.59
III. EXTENSION OF THE YOUNGER DOCTRINE TO CLAIMS FOR
MONEY DAMAGES WITHIN THE LOWER COURTS
The Supreme Court's decisions extending Younger abstention to civil
actions have fueled the Younger doctrine's growth within the lower courts,
where the doctrine has burgeoned into the realm of civil claims for
monetary damages. Although the Supreme Court has expressly reserved
the issue,60 a plurality of circuit courts have held that Younger abstention
applies to federal actions seeking only money damages.61 In one of the
more reasoned lower court decisions holding that Younger abstention
applies to money damages claims, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit in
Gilbertson v. Albright,62 held that Younger abstention could be applied to
civil claims for money damages. 63 In doing so, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's holding that Younger abstention may be applied to federal
actions seeking declaratory relief. The Gilbertson court stated that a
damages claim "would have the same practical impact as the declaration in
Samuels," since in order to determine whether the federal plaintiff is
entitled to damages, the "district court must first decide whether a
constitutional violation has occurred." 64 Extrapolating from Samuels, the
court opined that because
[i]t would frustrate the state's interest in administering its judicial
system, cast a negative light on the state court's ability to enforce
constitutional principles, and put the federal court in the position
of prematurely or unnecessarily deciding a question of federal
59. Id. at 73-74.
60. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 202 (1988) (presenting the petitioners argument
that Younger abstention applies to complaints seeking only monetary relief). The Court resolved
the case on an alternative basis, stating, "[wle need not decide the extent to which the Younger
doctrine applies to a federal action seeking only monetary relief ..... Id.
61. See Deakins, 484 U.S. at 208 (White, J., concurring) (stating that a plurality of circuits
apply Younger to claims for money damages). See also, e.g., Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens,
139 F.3d 1072, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that Younger abstention applies to § 1983 claim for
money damages); id. at 1077 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing cases from the First, Third, Fourth,
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits applying Younger to § 1983 claims for money damages and
stating that the majority opinion aligns the Sixth Circuit with this position); Green v. Benden, 281
F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that Younger abstention might apply to § 1983 claims for
money damages).
62. 381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
63. Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 984.
64. Id. at 979-80.
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constitutional law, adjudication of a § 1983 claim for money
damages would be just as intrusive as a declaratory judgment. 65
The view that Younger abstention can be applied to a civil claim for
money damages in federal court, however, is not uncontroversial. Con-
curring in Middlesex, Justice Brennan opined that the Younger doctrine was
originally crafted as an abstention doctrine limited to state criminal
proceedings. 66 Accordingly, Justice Brennan stated that Younger abstention
"is in general inapplicable to civil proceedings." 67 Furthermore, more than
once the Fifth Circuit has held that Younger abstention does not apply to
federal civil claims seeking only monetary damages.68 Adopting a more
restrictive view of the Younger doctrine, the Fifth Circuit has refused to
extend Younger abstention to money damages claims absent any indication
by the United States Supreme Court that such a course would be permis-
sible.69 As stated by the court in Bishop v. State Bar of Texas,70 civil
damages claims are a "species of relief wholly unaffected by Younger."71
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Kirschner v. Klemons72 held that because
abstention is generally appropriate only with regard to equitable claims,
Younger abstention is not directly applicable to § 1983 claims for monetary
relief only. 73
These decisions reflect of the general unease in extending the Younger
doctrine to monetary damages claims. There are three central concerns in
broadening Younger abstention: First, as a creature of equity, the Younger
doctrine does not easily translate to the context of money damages. In
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.,74 the Supreme Court instructed that
the authority to abstain arises from the courts' historic powers of equity
65. Id. at 980.
66. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 438 (Brennan, J., concurring).
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Alexander v. Ieyoub, 62 F.3d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[wie have
previously held that the Younger abstention doctrine does not apply to a suit seeking only
damages"); Lewis v. Beddingfield, 20 F.3d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that Younger
abstention is not applicable to § 1983 claim for damages); Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 835
F.2d 100, 104 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "requests for monetary damages do not fall within the
purview of the Younger abstention doctrine"); Bishop v. State Bar of Tx., 736 F.2d 292, 295 (5th
Cir. 1984) (stating that a § 1983 claim for damages is a "species of relief wholly unaffected by
Younger").
69. Lewis, 20 F.3d at 125.
70. 736 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 295,
72. 225 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2000).
73. Id. at 238-39. The court held that the district court had discretion to stay the damages
claim. Id.
74. 517 U.S. 706 (1996).
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jurisdiction.75 Therefore, the Court concluded that "federal court[s]...
[have] the power to dismiss or remand a case under the abstention doctrines
only" where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretion-
ary. 7 6 Money damages claims are an outcropping of legal, not equity
jurisdiction. Hence, Younger abstention seems inapt in the context of a
civil claim for money damages.
Second, extending Younger abstention to federal claims for money
damages runs counter to the federal courts' "strict duty to exercise the
jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress." 77 In New Orleans
Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans ("NOPSl"),78 the
Supreme Court stated that because "the federal courts' obligation to
adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction [is] 'virtually unflagging,"'
abstention "remains 'the exception, not the rule."' 79 The Supreme Court
has also instructed that Younger abstention is discretionary and
nonjurisdictional.80 Congress has expressly conferred upon federal courts
jurisdiction to entertain claims for damages arising out of constitutional
violations by government officials. 8' For federal courts to reject this duty
by invoking Younger abstention outside of the courts' equitable jurisdiction
where only money damages are at issue, runs counter to the principle that
federal courts should exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon them by
Congress.
The possibility of inefficient multi-jurisdictional litigation alone does
not justify abstention. The Framers' federalism inherently contemplates the
possibility of concurrent state and federal judicial proceedings. As a result,
"the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings
concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction."8 2 The
Supreme Court has indicated that while a unitary system places great value
75. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 717.
76. Id. at 730.
77. Id. at 716.
78. 491 U.S. 350 (1989).
79. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 359 (quoting Deakins, 484 U.S. at 203; Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984)).
80. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977).
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
82. McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910); accord Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422
U.S. 922, 928 (1975) (discussing risk of duplicative adjudication of cases on state and federal
levels). The Doran Court stated that:
the very existence of one system of federal courts and 50 systems of state courts, all
charged with the responsibility for interpreting the United States Constitution,
suggests that on occasion there will be duplicating and overlapping adjudication of
cases which are sufficiently similar in content, time, and location to justify being heard
before a single judge had they arisen within a unitary system.
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in avoiding conflicting outcomes in the litigation of similar issues, our dual,
federalist legal system allows for concurrent state and federal litigation on
similar issues, no matter how inefficient.83 "[T]he interest of avoiding
conflicting outcomes in the litigation of similar issues, while entitled to
substantial deference in a unitary system, must of necessity be subordinated
to the claims of federalism" in the federal court arena. 84 Thus, "the mere
potential for conflict in the results of adjudications," the Court stated in
Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States,85 "does not,
without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction."86
In NOPSI, the Court held that Younger's interference requirement was
not satisfied where the pending state court proceeding was a review of a
legislative act. 87 Because the federal claim was a constitutional challenge
to the legislative act and not the pending judicial proceeding itself, the
Court held that the interests of comity and federalism at play in Younger
were inapplicable. 88 The fact that the federal court's disposition of the
claim could preempt state judicial review, for practical purposes, had no
bearing on whether a court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction. 89 The
Court explained:
[I]t has never been suggested that Younger requires abstention in
deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or
executive action. Such a broad abstention requirement would
make a mockery of the rule that only exceptional circumstances
justify a federal court's refusal to decide a case in deference to the
States. 90
The limitations on the Younger doctrine expressed in NOPSI would be
severely undermined if Younger abstention could be applied whenever a
federal civil claim might possibly interfere with state litigation.
Finally, as a practical matter, evaluating whether federal litigation is
interfering with state proceedings becomes problematic when dealing with
damages. Certainly with respect to claims for injunctive relief-as in
Younger itself-the interference inquiry is more straightforward. It is
83. See Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1986) (stating that one
of the costs of our dual legal system is "inefficient simultaneous litigation in state and federal
courts on the same issue").
84. Doran, 422 U.S. at 928.
85. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
86. Colo. River Water Dist., 424 U.S. at 816.
87. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 372-
73 (1989).
88. Id. at 372.
89. Id. at 373.
90. Id. at 368.
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difficult to imagine a more obstructive judicial remedy than an injunction
prohibiting state court litigation from going forward. When money dam-
ages are at issue, however, interference is a matter of degree. Any civil suit
filed against the same parties to ongoing state-court litigation will interfere,
at least to some extent, with the state court litigation, even if only by
drawing the parties' resources away from the state-court litigation. Minute
levels of interference, however, will not suffice for purposes of Younger
abstention.9' The Middlesex requirement for application of Younger absten-
tion that the federal claim interfere with the state proceedings "is not met
simply by the prospect that the federal court decision may, through claim or
issue preclusion, influence the result in state court." 92 The Younger doc-
trine, after all, can only be applied in "exceptional circumstances." 93 This,
then, begs the question: just how much obstruction is sufficient to justify a
court's relinquishment of congressionally conferred jurisdiction?
A possible answer to this question is found in Justice White's
concurrence in Deakins.94 There, Justice White stated that the principles of
comity and "Our Federalism" that molded Younger should be given a
practical application. 95 Rather than focusing on the type of relief being
sought by the federal litigant, a federal court should focus on whether the
federal claims would in fact preempt the parallel state court proceeding.96
Thus, under Justice White's approach, a federal court would look to
whether a claim for damages functions as a de facto injunction against the
state court proceeding.97
This approach is familiar in federal jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, for instance, holds that a federal court lacks subject-matter juris-
diction to entertain de facto appeals from state court judgments. 98
Furthermore, it appears that the Ninth Circuit in Gilbertson v. Albright99
essentially adopted this approach in holding that the level of interference
91. Id. at 368-69.
92. Green v. City of Tucson, 255 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001 (en banc).
93. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368.
94. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 205 (1988) (White, J., concurring).
95. Id. at 206-07.
96. Id. at 209.
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing
applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). In his concurrence, Justice Marshall stated that
"[wihere federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it
is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited
appeal of the state-court judgment." Id. See also Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1161 (9th Cir.
2003) ("In seven cases in this circuit, we have held that Rooker-Feldman barred forbidden de
facto appeals from state court decisions.").
99. 381 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2004).
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necessary to trigger Younger abstention's application to a claim for money
damages is "that which would have the same practical effect on the state
proceeding as a formal injunction."10o By focusing on whether the federal
damages claim is a de facto claim for injunctive or declaratory relief, only
those damages claims that irreparably undermine the state court process
would be the proper target of Younger abstention.lOl Corollary damage
claims against a party to state court litigation would generally not be the
proper target of Younger abstention dismissal.10 2
In any case, even those jurisdictions that have applied Younger absten-
tion to claims for money damages have done so with caution. 103 A court
will abstain under Younger only where: (1) there are ongoing state judicial
proceedings; (2) those state proceedings implicate important state interests;
(3) the state proceedings provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate
opportunity to raise her federal claims; and (4) the federal litigation will
interfere with the state proceedings. 104 All these conditions are manda-
tory.105 The requirement that the state proceedings provide the federal
plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise her federal claims presents a
significant problem where a damages claim under § 1983 is at issue. 106 Be-
cause money damages claims under § 1983 will almost certainly be
unavailable in state civil enforcement actions, Younger abstention cannot be
applied in pure form in such cases. Various courts have approached this
dilemma differently. For example, the D.C. Circuit has held that the una-
vailability of § 1983 damages in the pending state court proceedings renders
Younger abstention completely inapplicable. 107 The plurality of courts of
appeals has taken the position that, at the very least, where money damages
are at issue, a court entertaining a federal § 1983 action must stay the action
in lieu of dismissal. 108
100. Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 978.
101. Id. at 977-78.
102. Id. at 978.
103. See infra note 108.
104. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982);
see also Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 426 (1979) (stating that a federal court should not abstain if
"state law clearly bars the interposition of the constitutional claims"); Green v. City of Tucson,
255 F.3d 1086, 1091 (9th Cir. 2001) (listing necessary elements for invoking Younger abstention);
Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. Of Med. Exam'rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Trust
& Inv. Advisors, Inc. v. Hogsett, 43 F.3d 290, 295 (7th Cir. 1994) (same).
105. See generally Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432 (discussing the aforementioned elements and
their importance).
106. See id. at 435-36.
107. See Bridges v. Kelly, 84 F.3d 470, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Dist. Props. Assocs. v. Dist.
of Columbia, 743 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
108. E.g., Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 984 (9th Cir. 2004); Kirschner v. Klemons,
225 F.3d 227, 238 (2d Cir. 2000). The court stated:
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Staying rather than dismissing the federal money damages claims
avoids the possibility that the federal plaintiff will be denied a forum in
which to bring forth her damages claims. Without commenting on the for-
mer, the Supreme Court has approved of the latter approach.109 In Deakins,
the Court, avoiding the question of the extent to which Younger applies to
money damages claims, stated that a court "has no discretion to dismiss
rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the
state proceeding[s]."110
At the very least, dismissal of a federal claim for money damages
under Younger is improper and should be avoided because of the incon-
gruities between the principles underlying Younger abstention and federal
civil damages claims. In Quackenbush, the Supreme Court held that dis-
missal or remand for abstention purposes is based on the federal courts'
traditional discretion to deny equitable relief."' Therefore, a court cannot
employ abstention principles to dismiss damages claims, which fall outside
of the courts' equity jurisdiction." 2 "Under our precedents," the Court
stated, "federal courts have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on
abstention principles only where the relief being sought is equitable or
otherwise discretionary."1l 3 Although Quackenbush's admonition has not
We have held that abstention and dismissal are inappropriate when damages are
sought, even when a pending state proceeding raises identical issues and we would
dismiss otherwise identical claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, but that a stay
of the action pending resolution of the state proceeding may be appropriate.
Id.; see Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Stroud, 179 F.3d 598, 603-04 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a stay rather than a dismissal is appropriate when "monetary damages are sought in addition
to injunctive relief and the federal court is not asked to declare a state statute unconstitutional in
order to award damages"); Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139 F.3d 1072, 1075-76 (6th Cir.
1998) ("We therefore affirm the District Court's application of Younger abstention to Carroll's
case but remand the case for the District Court to stay rather than dismiss her lawsuit until the
conclusion of the state proceedings."); Pompey v. Broward County, 95 F.3d 1543, 1552 n.12 (1 1th
Cir. 1996) ("It is doubtful that federal district courts may dismiss claims for damages under
abstention principles."); Simpson v. Rowan, 73 F.3d 134, 138 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that a
federal case must be stayed rather than dismissed where damages are not available in a state
proceeding); Kyricopoulos v. Town of Orleans, 967 F.2d 14, 15 n.l (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam)
("As for § 1983 damages actions, it is appropriate to stay the federal action pending the conclusion
of the state criminal proceedings."); Traverso v. Penn, 874 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1989) ("That
the § 1983 claim at issue seeks not only injunctive and declarative relief but money damages as
well does not preclude abstention as to the whole action. Under our decisions, the appropriate
course is to abstain by staying proceedings on monetary as well as injunctive and declaratory
actions."); Williams v. Hepting, 844 F.2d 138, 144-45 (3d. Cir. 1988) (same).
109. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1988).
110. Id. at 202.
111. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996).
112. Id.
113. Id.
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been universally followed, 14 it has generally been adhered to.115 It seems
plain, therefore, that if a court chooses to apply Younger abstention to civil
claims for money damages, at the very least, it is appropriate to stay rather
than dismiss the claims. 16
IV. SURPRISE, SURPRISE: SUA SPONTE APPLICATION OF
YOUNGER ABSTENTION ON APPEAL
The Younger doctrine has expanded procedurally as well as in scope.
Litigants should be aware of the possibility that Younger abstention may
untowardly appear in a lawsuit without having been invited by the parties.
This possibility exists not just at the inception of the lawsuit, but also after
issuance of a judgment. Indeed, many courts have taken the position that a
court may raise Younger abstention sua sponte for the first time on
appeal. 1' 7 Combined with the fact that a majority of courts now apply
Younger abstention to claims for civil damages, 1 8 with sua sponte appli-
cation of Younger abstention on appeal the universe of cases that can
potentially be dismissed based on Younger abstention is far broader than
originally portended by the Supreme Court in Younger and Samuels.
The possibility that Younger abstention can be raised on the court's
own motion on appeal can lead to peculiar results, and appears at odds with
the doctrine's original intent. For instance, one of the requirements for
applying Younger abstention is that there be ongoing state court pro-
ceedings.119 The time frame for determining whether or not state court
proceedings are ongoing, however, is determined from the time the federal
complaint is filed, to the time "any [federal] proceedings of substance on
the merits" have transpired.120 Because a court of appeals, in most cases,
114. See, e.g., Majors v. Engelbrecht, 149 F.3d 709, 714 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that
because constitutional claims could be asserted in state proceedings, the federal court properly
dismissed the plaintiff's § 1983 claims for money damages, and not discussing Quackenbush).
115. See, e.g., DeMauro v. DeMauro, 115 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1997) (relying on
Quackenbush in holding that abstention does not allow for dismissal of damages claim); Amerson
v. Iowa, 94 F.3d 510, 512-13 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
116. See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 985 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing cases).
117. E.g., Lawrence v. McCarthy, 344 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2003); Columbia Basin
Apartment Ass'n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 799 (9th Cir. 2001); Barichello v. McDonald, 98
F.3d 948, 955 (7th Cir. 1996); Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1996);
O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 786 n.l (3d Cir. 1994); Federal Exp. Corp. v. Tenn.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 925 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1991).
118. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
119. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
120. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975); see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452, 462 (1974) (holding that Younger abstention is inappropriate when no state-court proceeding
"is pending at the time the federal complaint is filed"); Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 782
(9th Cir. 1988) (stating that a court looks to whether state court proceedings were ongoing at the
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will entertain an appeal years after the underlying state action was origi-
nally filed, a court of appeals raising Younger abstention sua sponte would
potentially be able to dismiss a federal action long after any parallel state
court proceedings have concluded, without regard to whether or not the
issue of Younger abstention was raised in the proceedings below. This
seems a far cry from the original equity and comity concerns that drove the
creation of the Younger doctrine. 121
The Supreme Court has not addressed the propriety of sua sponte
application of Younger abstention on appeal, and many lower courts have
expressed disagreement with such an approach. 2 2 The court of appeals
decisions stating that sua sponte implementation of Younger on appeal is
permissible generally do so with little discussion.123 In almost all instances,
their support for this proposition can be traced to one primary source, a
footnote in Bellotti v. Baird,124 a Supreme Court decision addressing
Pullman abstention. 125
The most oft-cited language in Bellotti is a portion of a footnote that
reads, "[I]t would appear that abstention may be raised by the court sua
sponte."'126 This line, however, is more ambiguous than it appears. Bellotti
involved a challenge to a Massachusetts statute governing when a minor
time the federal action was commenced); Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d 199, 204 (6th Cir. 1986)
("We agree that the proper time of reference for determining the applicability of Younger
abstention is the time that the federal complaint is filed.").
121. But see Maymo-Melendez v. Alvarez-Ramirez, 364 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 2004) (opining
that "it makes little sense to ignore Younger's policy simply because the state process has come to
an end. After all, how does it 'respect' state proceedings to wait until they are concluded and then
ignore or overturn them?"). However, the court later noted that applying Younger abstention after
state proceedings have ended is rarely necessary since "other rubrics," such as res judicata, the
federal full faith and credit statute, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, usually foreclose any
collateral attack after the state proceedings have ended. Id.
122. See, e.g., Winston v. Children & Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991)
("[W]e decline to decide the abstention issue on our own motion"); Walnut Properties, Inc. v. City
of Whittier, 861 F.2d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (declining to address abstention issue because
issue was not raised until second appeal from district court and after earlier remand from Supreme
Court); Shannon v. Telco Communications, Inc., 824 F.2d 150, 151-52 (1st Cir. 1987) (because
state did not press the abstention issue before the court of appeals, court addressed merits of
appeal); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 163 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
("Appellant did not raise the question of Younger abstention, and that issue, being non-
jurisdictional, is thus not before this court.").
123. See Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1391-92 (10th Cit. 1996) (relying on Bellotti);
O'Neill v. City of Philadelphia, 32 F.3d 785, 786 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Federal Exp. Corp. v.
Tennessee Public Service Comm'n, 925 F.2d 962, 966 (6th Cir. 1991) (same).
124. 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
125. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 477 (1977) ("Pullman
abstention, involves an inquiry focused on the possibility that the state courts may interpret a
challenged state statute so as to eliminate, or at least to alter materially, the constitutional question
presented.").
126. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976).
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was required to obtain parental consent to obtain an abortion.127 The
defendants in Bellotti requested that the district court abstain from deciding
the case under Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.,128 because,
under Pullman, the statute was capable of a construction that would avoid
any federal constitutional issues since the statute had not yet been construed
by state courts. 129 The district court instead chose to adjudicate the merits
of the plaintiffs' challenge. 130 The Court held that because it was possible
to construe the Massachusetts statute to avoid any conflict with the
Constitution, the district court should have abstained under Pullman.131
Two considerations militate against a broad reading of the Bellotti
footnote. First, this language is likely dictum since the Supreme Court in
Bellotti did not, in fact, raise abstention sua sponte.132 Rather, the Bellotti
defendants raised the issue of abstention throughout the litigation of the
case, including in their briefs before the Supreme Court.133 Second, the
language referring to sua sponte abstention must be read in context. The
footnote in which this language appears is not concerned with sua sponte
application of Younger abstention.1 34 Instead, it addresses the hypothetical
question of whether the Court would have been permitted to consider the
defendants' constitutionally sound alternative interpretation of the Massa-
chusetts statute had that interpretation not been suggested to the district
court-an issue unique to Pullman abstention. 135 The Court opined that it
was permissible to entertain constitutional alternative interpretations of a
statute that have not been presented to a court by the parties, stating that:
[tihe practice of abstention is equitable in nature, and it would not
be improper to consider the effect of delay caused by the State's
failure to suggest or seek a constitutional interpretation. In the
instant case, however, there has been no injury to appellees' rights
due to the delay (if any) in the appellants' coming forward with the
interpretation they now espouse. As a result of the various orders
of the District Court, the challenged portion of the statute has
never gone into effect. Nor can we adopt the view that once a
127. Id. at 134.
128. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
129. Bellotti, 428 U.S. at 134.
130. Id. at 136.
131. Id. at 150.
132. See id. at 143 n.10 (providing the only place, in one sentence where the phrase "sua
sponte" is mentioned in the opinion).
133. See id. at 138-39 (describing the procedural history of the case, including defendants'
raising of the abstention issue).
134. Id. at 143 n.10.
135. Id.
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request for abstention is made, it is beyond the power of the
District Court to consider possible interpretations that have not
been put forth by the parties. Indeed, it would appear that absten-
tion may be raised by the court sua sponte.136
This statement reveals the latent ambiguity surrounding the Bellotti
footnote. Is the Court, in stating that abstention may be raised sua sponte,
referring to raising Pullman abstention for the first time during the appellate
process, or is the Court referring to the district court's ability to consider
possible constitutionally permissible interpretations of the state statute at
issue not presented by the parties? Given that the remainder of the footnote
concerns the Court's ability to consider alternative statutory interpretations
not raised before the district court for purposes of Pullman abstention, the
latter explanation is most plausible. In any case, the Bellotti footnote,
wholly consumed with issues unique to Pullman abstention, lends little
support to the proposition that Younger abstention may be raised by a court
sua sponte on appeal.
In addition, interpreting the Bellotti footnote to allow for sua sponte
application of Younger abstention on appeal runs at tension with language
in other decisions of the Court suggesting that courts should be wary of
raising Younger abstention sua sponte on appeal. In Ohio Bureau of
Employment Services v. Hodory,137 the Court explained that Younger
abstention "express[es] equitable principles of comity and federalism," and
is "designed to allow the State an opportunity to 'set its own house in order'
when the federal issue is already before a state tribunal." 138 These interests
are not furthered when Younger abstention is applied sua sponte by the
court of appeals well after the state litigation has ceased. Because Younger
abstention is not obligatory, the Court held that a State can waive Younger
abstention and elect to litigate in the federal forum: "If the State voluntarily
chooses to submit to a federal forum, principles of comity do not demand
that the federal court force the case back into the State's own system." 139
The Court stated that a federal court is not "compelled to abstain" every
time the elements of Younger abstention are met, and "Younger principles
of equity and comity" are not offended by waiver. 140 Therefore, the Court
declined to apply Younger abstention sua sponte.14
136. Id.
137. 431 U.S. 471,480 (1977).
138. Hodory, 431 U.S. at 479-80.
139. Id. at 480.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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The Supreme Court later relied on this language in Hodory in refusing
to apply Younger abstention sua sponte. 142 In Swisher v. Brady, 43 the
Supreme Court, citing Hodory, stated that where the state-defendant failed
to raise Younger abstention either before the Court or the lower courts, the
Court would not examine the issue on its own: "The State did not contend,
either in the District Court or here, that appellees' suit for injunctive relief
should be dismissed under the abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris. In
these circumstances, we are not inclined to examine the application of the
doctrine sua sponte."'44
It cannot be stated that the Court's statements in Hodory and Swisher
absolutely preclude sua sponte application of Younger on appeal. Still, the
notion that a court can apply Younger abstention sua sponte on appeal cuts
counter to the principle announced in Hodory permitting a state-party to
waive Younger abstention.145 If Younger abstention can be waived, a court
applying Younger sua sponte may be thwarting a state-defendant's informed
choice to proceed with federal adjudication. After all, the most clear
indication that a party has waived an argument is its decision to omit the
matter from its brief.146 Thus, a rule permitting sua sponte application of
Younger abstention would risk undermining the Supreme Court's holding
that a state-defendant can validly waive Younger abstention. 47
Furthermore, Hodory and Swisher clearly indicate that because
Younger abstention is based on equity and comity considerations, it may be
applied flexibly by courts.148 Unlike federal subject-matter jurisdiction,
which a federal court is obligated to examine sua sponte at all stages of
litigation, 49 a federal court is not duty-bound to examine whether Younger
abstention applies.150 This distinction between abstention and subject-
142. Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.ll (1978).
143. 438 U.S. 204 (1978).
144. Swisher, 438 U.S. at 213 n.1 1 (citations omitted).
145. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471,480 (1977).
146. See Winston v. Children & Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
that defendants had waived any claim for abstention by not raising it in their brief).
147. See Hodory, 431 U.S. at 480 (stating that the federal court "is not required to abstain in
every situation"); Shannon v. Telco Commc'ns, Inc., 824 F.2d 150, 151-52 (1st Cir. 1987)
(explaining that because the state did not press the abstention issue before court of appeals, the
court addressed merits of appeal); Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 803 (9th Cir. 1983) (providing
that submission of an issue of a statute's constitutionality to the district court, Hawaii's attorney
general effectively waived claim for Younger abstention).
148. See, e.g., Hodory, 431 U.S. at 480 (putting forth that courts may have a choice in
whether or not they will be required to abstain in every situation).
149. See Steel Co. v. Citizens For Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (noting that
jurisdiction is a threshold issue that must be raised sua sponte).
150. Hodory, 431 U.S. at 480.
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matter jurisdiction was missed in Barichello v. McDonald,151 the Seventh
Circuit's decision permitting sua sponte application of Younger abstention
on appeal.152  Instead of relying on Bellotti-as do the other court of
appeals decisions applying Younger abstention on appeal-the court in
Barichello reasoned that because "[t]he abstention doctrines all concern the
propriety of exercising subject matter jurisdiction," and federal courts are
required to inquire sua sponte into issues related to their subject-matter
jurisdiction, a court must abstain under Younger sua sponte.153 Hence,
Barichello reaches its conclusion by placing abstention on the same footing
with subject-matter jurisdiction. 154
This approach is flawed. There is a robust body of authority clearly
stating that abstention is not a component of federal subject-matter jurisdic-
tion. 155 Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, abstention is not a necessary
predicate for federal adjudication of a claim. Rather, abstention derives
from the court's equity jurisdiction, and is created by the judiciary and
malleable to the particular facts of a case.156 In Ohio Civil Rights
Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc.,157 the Court explained that
Younger abstention "does not arise from lack of jurisdiction in the District
Court, but from strong policies counseling against the exercise of such
jurisdiction where particular kinds of state proceedings have already been
commenced."158
If abstention were an outcropping of subject-matter jurisdiction, sua
sponte application would be obligatory, not merely permissible. The Court
151. 98 F.3d 948 (7th Cir. 1996).
152. Barichello, 98 F.3d at 956.
153. Id. at 955.
154. The Ninth Circuit similarly equated abstention with subject-matter jurisdiction in
Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1113 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that "Younger abstention is
essentially a jurisdictional doctrine").
155. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
626 (1986) (stating that Younger abstention is not jurisdictional); England v. Louisiana State Bd.
of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964) ("[A]bstention 'does not, of course, involve the
abdication of federal jurisdiction, but only the postponement of its exercise."') (quoting Harrison
v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959)); Benavidez v. Eu, 34 F.3d 825, 829 (9th Cir. 1994)
("Younger abstention is not jurisdictional, but reflects a court's prudential decision not to exercise
jurisdiction which it in fact possesses."); Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159. 163
n.6 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that Younger abstention is "non-jurisdictional").
156. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,
358-59 (1989) (distinguishing abstention from subject-matter jurisdiction based on their
characteristics); Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 36 n. I (2d Cir. 1978) ("Younger abstention
goes to the exercise of equity jurisdiction, not to the jurisdiction of the federal district court as
such to hear the case.").
157. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
158. Ohio Civil Rights Comm 'n, 477 U.S. at 626.
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has made clear, however, that Younger abstention is not obligatory. 159
Because of this, the fact that subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised sua
sponte provides no support for a similar sua sponte approach to Younger
abstention. The Third Circuit noted the distinction between subject-matter
jurisdiction and Younger abstention in McLaughlin v. Pernsleyl60 where it
declined to raise Younger abstention sua sponte in part because "abstention
is not jurisdictional but implicates the exercise of equitable powers," 16' and
again in Winston, in which it stated that "[b]ecause abstention is not
jurisdictional but implicates the exercise of equitable powers ... we decline
to decide the abstention issue on our own motion." 162 Further, in Universal
Amusement Co. v. Vance, 163 the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that
because the appellant "did not raise the question of Younger abstention,"
and because Younger abstention is non-jurisdictional, the issue was not
properly before the court. 1 64
While the Court has instructed that where a case satisfies Younger's
requirements "there is no discretion to grant injunctive relief,"165 this is not
the same as stating that a federal court must raise Younger abstention sua
sponte on appeal, especially where injunctive relief is not at issue. Indeed,
where the parallel state proceedings have concluded, raising Younger
abstention sua sponte on appeal seems especially inapt since the comity
interests which drive Younger abstention are absent. Further, although the
lower courts have described Younger abstention as being "mandatory"
when the Middlesex factors are met,166 the requirement of the existence of a
159. See Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977) ("It may
not be argued, however, that a federal court is compelled to abstain in every such situation [when
the federal issue is already before a state court].").
160. 876 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1989).
161. McLaughlin, 876 F.2d at 314 n.5.
162. Winston v. Children & Youth Servs., 948 F.2d 1380, 1385 (3d Cir. 1991).
163. 587 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1978). The Court has stated that while certain quasi-
jurisdictional doctrines, such as habeas exhaustion and Eleventh Amendment Immunity, may be
raised sua sponte, there is no judicial duty to do so. See, e.g., Test v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 90 (5th
Cir. 1997) (providing an example of a habeas case); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515,
n.19 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that Eleventh Amendment need not be raised sua sponte). On the
other hand, doctrines unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction, such as personal jurisdiction, cannot
be raised sua sponte. For instance, with respect to claim preclusion and res judicata, the Court has
stated that where a court is not on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented, it
should be wary of raising preclusion issues sua sponte. See Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392,
412 (2000). On this continuum, abstention, being unrelated to subject-matter jurisdiction, is closer
to the latter group of cases.
164. Universal Amusement Co., 587 F.2d at 163 n.6.
165. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. V. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 n.22 (1976).
166. E.g., Rio Grande Cmty. Health Center, Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2005);
Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 100-01 (2d Cir. 2005).
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pending state proceeding is not arguably met where Younger is raised on
appeal long after the parallel state proceedings have terminated. 167
Of course, it is important as a matter of policy and judicial efficiency to
permit courts to apply Younger abstention sua sponte when comity interests
demand such action. Sua sponte application of Younger abstention, how-
ever, should be reserved for those instances where the interests that bore the
Younger doctrine-equity and comity-are present.168 Those interests are
not present where the parallel state litigation has been terminated. Viewed
in this light and given the Court's disinclination to examine the applicability
of Younger sua sponte in Swisher,169 federal courts should at the very least
refrain from applying Younger abstention sua sponte on appeal once the
underlying state proceedings have concluded.
V. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the development of the Younger doctrine within the
lower courts has been quite expansive.170 The condition in which the
Younger doctrine now finds itself is a far-cry from the modest abstention
doctrine borne by the Supreme Court in Younger v. Harris. This substantial
doctrinal enlargement should give us pause. While the Supreme Court's
holdings that Younger abstention applies to state civil proceedings that
resemble criminal actions kept with the spirit of Younger, the doctrine's
cross-over to money damages claims is awkward.171 Unlike injunctive and
declaratory relief, money damages do not stem from the courts' equitable
jurisdiction. Indeed, in our common law heritage, money damages existed
in the entirely distinct jurisdiction of courts of law.
Further, sua sponte application of Younger abstention on appeal,
though perhaps facially appealing, rests on a superficial reading of a
footnote in Bellotti.172 In fact, closer analysis reveals that the Supreme
Court has not squarely permitted sua sponte abstention at the appellate
level, and from all indications would likely disfavor such practices.173 This
is for good reason: Application of Younger abstention on appeal is
particularly suspect given the possibility that a court will abstain long after
any parallel state court proceedings have concluded.174 Such application
167. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
168. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
169. See Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204, 213 n.11 (1978).
170. See infra Part III (detailing the expansion of the abstention doctrine in circuit courts).
171. See infra Part III.
172. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 143 n.10 (1976) (providing the mentioned footnote).
173. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 480 (1977).
174. See infra Part IV.
[VOL. 81:475
PUSHING DOCTRINAL LIMITS
would fly in the face of the original equity and comity concerns that bore
Younger.
Although courts are unlikely to peel back their extension of the
Younger doctrine to claims for money damages and their application of
Younger abstention sua sponte on appeal, it is important to be cognizant of
the radical expansion that has befallen a doctrine that was originally in-
tended to be limited to "exceptional circumstances." 75 The extension of
the Younger doctrine threatens to erode the venerable principle that federal
courts have a "strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon
them by Congress." 176 This is a principle worth upholding.
175. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368
(1989).
176. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996).
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